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In this paper we examine incentives to cheat in the Mexican tax system and argue that 
these are affected by interactions between taxes. We use variation in tax status between 
Mexican firms and variation in the tax rate between different regions within Mexico to 
investigate the interaction effects between different taxes that firms face. Firms’ 
reported profits for one tax, the corporate income tax (CIT), depend on the tax status for 
its inputs and outputs of another tax, the Value-Added Tax (VAT). In other words, VAT 
exemptions do not only lead to evasion of VAT; they also lead to greater evasion of the 
CIT, thereby exacerbating the loss of revenues caused by the exemptions. Juxtaposing 
results from a dataset from Mexico’s Tax Administration with Economic Census data 
shows that misreporting to the tax agency is particularly high when tax exemptions are 
present. We place the results within the broader framework of the tax reform agenda in 
Mexico that involves decisions affecting states and households in different 
circumstances as well as investment decisions. These results have implications for other 
developing countries that have growing informality and tax evasion, as in Pakistan. 
Short-term fixes, such as amnesties, do not begin to address the underlying incentive 
difficulties and only serve to make matters worse and should be avoided. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
A major tax reform was undertaken in Mexico in the early 1980s, with the introduction 
of a Value Added Tax (VAT), together with a rationalization of federal and state level 
taxes and the establishment of a world-class tax administration, the Servicio 
Administrativo Tributário (SAT). The VAT was introduced as a federally administered 
tax with shared revenues, allowing the removal of many distortive taxes at the state 
level (Gil Diaz, 1987). This had many desirable features, in that an “efficient” tax was 
designed to be implemented by a single federal agency, avoiding the complexity and 
distortions faced in Brazil with the origin based state level VATs.  It also avoided the 
split bases for the GST between goods and services, as in India and Pakistan. It is 
interesting that Mexico was included as part of a World Bank project in the 1980s on tax 
reforms in developing countries,1 given the very significant reforms that had already 
taken place and could be a model for countries like India and Pakistan (for other 
countries in the study at that time, see Ahmad and Stern, 1991).  
Yet, with the creeping introduction of special provisions and exemptions in both the 
income taxes and the VAT, Mexican non-oil tax revenue collections have fallen to around 
10% of GDP, well below both the OECD and Latin American averages (OECD, 2010). 
Thus, the Mexican tax system has more in common with one of the worst performing tax 
systems in the world—ironically Pakistan—than with its neighbours in Latin America. 
It is striking that the Mexican non-oil tax collection, which was around the Latin 
American average in 1990-92—albeit well below the large federations, Brazil and 
Argentina (see Table 1.1)—had fallen to the lowest place by 2008-9 and is the only 
country represented in Table 1.1 where revenues as a share of GDP have actually fallen. 
By then, Mexico at 10.7% was far below the Latin American average of 18.5% of GDP, 
and even further behind Brazil at 34.4% of GDP. The increasing tax breaks, exemptions 
and preferences that had crept in for many “well-meaning purposes”, largely provide 
opportunities to cheat and evade taxes—but have otherwise become redundant. 
Among the well-meaning purposes were the encouragement of trade and investment, 
which was stifled by the existence of high tariffs and other barriers to investment in 
Mexico. This led in the 1980s to the maquiladoras regime allowing manufacture for re-
export to circumvent many of these onerous barriers. However, with the reforms to the 
Mexican trade and investment regime (particularly rationalization of tariffs), the 
maquiladoras regime is now best described as a convenient vehicle for the avoidance 
and/or evasion of income taxes and the VAT.  
A second well-meaning purpose was protection of the poor. In the absence of any 
effective means of redistributing income, and in particular any means of reaching the 
poorest, policymakers turned to the tax system and built several distributional 
measures into the design of the VAT and granted exemptions to sources of income 
believed to be concentrated among the poor in the income taxes. Currently, while 
                                                             
1 This was directed by Ehtisham Ahmad together with Nicholas Stern and Jesús Seade, initially 
at the University of Warwick in the mid-1980s. 
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personal income tax revenues remain paltry, the scope for redistribution through the 
income tax as it currently stands is concomitantly limited (Bird and Zolt, 2005).  
 
Table 1.1  Tax collections in selected Latin American countries (% of GDP) 
 1990-92 2008-09 
Brazil 23.7 34.4 
Argentina 18.5 31.2 
Uruguay 22.5 24.6 
Mexico 12.7 10.7 
Guatemala   8.8 11.1 
Dominican Republic   8.6 14.1 
Average Latin America 14.0 18.5 
Source: CAF, 2011. 
The adverse distributional consequences of reforms that increase the efficiency of the 
main taxes could be effectively offset through expansion and reform of direct transfer 
programs rather than through distortionary measures in the tax code, raising overall 
efficiency (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; and Saez, 2004) and hence the ability to increase 
revenues without adversely affecting the poor. This involves a careful description of 
gainers and losers as a result of the tax reforms, While direct social assistance 
programs, such as Oportunidades, have been effective in reaching the poor, and have 
been replicated elsewhere, including Brazil and Pakistan, adding yet more weight to 
Oportunidades may not be the best way to compensate those affected by the tax 
reforms in Mexico—we expand on this point in Section IV.  
The disappointing revenue performance is largely due to the poor performance of the 
VAT.  A C-efficiency2 of around 0.25 for the VAT puts Mexico in roughly the same league 
as Pakistan (which also has a low tax/GDP ratio of under 10%). Turkey is a developing 
country, also in the OECD and with roughly the same characteristics as Mexico—in 
terms of the importance of agriculture, a growing industrial sector on the border of the 
EU, large population as well as informality. However, the Turkish VAT had a C-efficiency 
of .47 around 2005, similar to that of Sri Lanka (which could be deemed to have 
comparable levels of efficiency and insurgency as in Pakistan). 
On the Corporate Income Tax (see Table 1.2), the Mexican performance is at the OECD 
average, but well below Latin American standards. At around 3% of GDP, Mexican CIT 
collection is significantly lower than in Chile, and also Brazil. However, the personal 
income tax appears to be around the Latin American average—but this is well below the 
levels that have become standard in the OECD.  
While international comparisons are important in showing how Mexico fares vis-á-vis 
its comparators in the region, or in the OECD, they are a poor guide as to how the gaps 
can be filled and how quickly. It is therefore advisable to keep the Latin American and 
                                                             
2 The C-efficiency is the ratio of VAT revenue to aggregate consumption, divided by the 
standard VAT rate (see Ebrill et al., 2001). 
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OECD standards as indicators of broad potential, but relate the short-term possibilities 
in relation to what is feasible in Mexico, given its institutional and policy constraints. 
 
 Table 1.2 Income Taxes in selected Latin American countries (% of GDP) 
 CIT PIT 
Argentina 3.6 1.6 
Brazil 5.1 2.6 
Chile 7.3 1.2 
Mexico 2.4 2.2 
Latin American average 3.6 1.4 
Source: CAF, 2011. 
 
Antón, Hernández and Levy (2012) argue that one of the causes of the poor 
performance of Mexican public finances is the structure of incentives that reflects 
disincentives associated with inappropriately designed formal benefit systems, financed 
through distorting payroll taxes that fall largely on the formal sector. Thus, there are 
major incentives for informality with the concomitant implications for efficiency, 
investment and growth. The solution proposed by Antón, Hernández and Levy (2012) is 
to shift largely to a reformed social protection mechanism, financed by general revenues 
relying largely on a reformed VAT.  
Direct attempts to reform the VAT in both the Fox and the Calderón administrations 
failed largely due to the vested interests that take refuge behind the argument that the 
poor and the states might lose as a result of the reforms. However, reforming the VAT 
remains at the heart of any strategy to significantly improve the Mexican non-oil 
tax/GDP ratio.  However, it has to be part of a broader package of reforms that address 
the political economy concerns. Indeed, the successful “plugging” of the holes of the 
corporate income tax by the Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única (IETU) in 2007 built on 
the “hold-harmless” criteria that ensured that no state was adversely affected by the 
reforms.3  
In this paper we focus on the disincentives in the major taxes that generate cheating, 
even though Mexico has one of the most modern tax administrations in Latin America. 
We argue that the generation of information on transaction chains that is made possible 
by a reformed VAT is critical in closing the gaps and preventing cheating. 
  
                                                             
3 See SHCP(2011) and Ahmad et al, 2007 for a discussion of the strategy leading to the IETU.  
Also see Ahmad, Li and Richardson (2002) and Ahmad (2011) for a discussion of the Chinese 
case. 
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2. TAX GAPS AND INCENTIVES TO CHEAT 
 
The growing incentives to cheat in the Mexican tax system are associated with 
exemptions and special provisions that are amplified as gaps in one tax have knock on 
effects on revenues from other taxes – what we call tax interaction effects. In addition to 
the exemptions and zero-ratings in the VAT, the special lower rate for border regions, 
which has crept further and further from the Northern and Southern borders into the 
interior of the country, creates a system of multiple tax rates for the same good in a 
single economy, opening up possibilities for arbitrage. Exemptions and deductions (e.g., 
cars) also accumulated in the income tax (ISR), creating a Swiss cheese effect on the tax 
base, and amplifying the incentives to take advantage of the loopholes. 
Splitting the bases of the main taxes—VAT and ISR—between the federal and state 
governments creates a further distortion. The administration and revenues of the small 
taxpayers (for both the VAT and ISR/IETU), with a turnover of below MX$2m, were 
assigned to the states under the Régimen de Pequeños Contribuyentes (REPECOS).  As 
has been recently estimated, the states have little ability or incentive to administer the 
REPECOS and evasion is believed to be in excess of 90% (SAT 2010). Worse still, since 
firms know that paying taxes under REPECOS frees them from the threat of oversight by 
SAT, and also that the state governments are unwilling and/or unable to enforce 
REPECOS as long as they pay something, Almunia & Best (2012) show that there is 
bunching of firms at the lowest end, with over 90% of firms in some states paying the 
very minimum amount possible. 
The overall incentives for businesses to cheat generated by this widespread evasion are 
summarized in Chart 1. Apart from relatively few large and small firms that are in full 
compliance (dark shaded boxes to the right), even large-scale firms have an incentive to 
only partially declare sales, employment or profits. There are likely to be a great many 
firms masquerading as REPECOS eligible firms in order to take advantage of the 
extremely low monitoring of REPECOS taxpayers. Much more worryingly, however, as 
neither the state tax administrations nor the SAT monitor these firms, illegal business-
to-business transactions and sales are facilitated. This means that there will be holes in 
information on the production chain under the VAT, leading to the breakdown of the 
flow of incentives along value chains. Most importantly, though, REPECOS act as very 
safe, easy intermediaries for larger firms to sell into the informal sector, hence under-
declaring their sales for the purposes of the VAT and the ISR, and consequently reducing 
their taxable value added/profits.  
In the 1980s and previously, Mexico had a restrictive trade regime, high tariffs and an 
uncompetitive exchange rate. In order to encourage foreign investment for exports, 
especially to the US, the maquiladora regime was introduced, and has had considerable 
success in generating both investment and growth in employment.  However, with 
NAFTA, and the 2008-13 trade reforms, tariffs have been reduced and simplified, wages 
are generally competitive, the exchange rate is market determined, and flexible foreign 
ownership provisions have been facilitated in most sectors. Furthermore, exports are 
zero-rated under the VAT, and consequently the border rate has become redundant.  
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Chart 1.  Incentives to Cheat in Mexico 
 
The safe haven provisions were reinforced with the halving of the taxes generated by 
the maquiladoras in 2002. This sector generates negligible revenues and has become a 
source of distortions and evasion. Avoidance possibilities abound, including shifting 
activities and “profits” to maquiladora subsidiaries, and the possibility of carousel fraud. 
We examine this set of issues in the empirical work in the sections below. 
The revenue sink-holes created by the maquiladoras are summarized in Chart 2. It 
shows the circuits for import and export fraud, as well as carousel fraud. It also shows 
how Mexican producers might abuse the maquiladora provisions to disguise input 
credits and show profits as if they were generated by the less taxed maquiladora sector.  
The well-meaning special provisions for various sectors and border regions, together 
with the split bases for the income tax and VAT, are the main reasons for the incentives 
and dodges that facilitate “cheating” by Mexican taxpayers. The split bases due to 
REPECOS (for both the VAT and ISR) amplify the absence of incentives for states to 
follow-up. The situation is made worse by the maquiladoras. These interact with the 
holes in the tax system to make the incentives to cheat and evade stronger and more 
rewarding. Under the present conditions, where the policy framework is close to 
establishing a level playing field, the incentives associated with the maquiladoras are 






Chart 2. The maquiladora sink holes 
 
 
In sum, given the holes in the tax system, the relevant question is not why the tax 
collections are so low, but how the very efficient SAT manages to collect as much as it 
does. The Mexican experience also shows that once the special privileges are 
established, it becomes almost impossible to do away with them directly. The political 
deals in an opaque budgetary process create a vicious cycle that is amplified by the 
interactions between the taxes, together with the limitations on the tax 
administration—especially the poor flow of information, given silos within the same 
institution, and across government agencies at different levels of administration. 
We will examine further the empirical data for corroboration of these effects.  However, 
what is not possible, with the data at hand, is to get a fix on the extent of transactions 
that take place completely outside the reported circuit (either to SAT or to the state tax 
administrations). However, the juxtaposition of information reported to SAT and the 




3. TAX ON TAX INTERACTIONS AND INCENTIVES TO CHEAT 
Exemptions lead to an obvious loss in revenue from contracting the taxable base for a 
particular tax. In addition, tax interaction effects between different taxes a firm faces 
may exacerbate the loss in revenues. That is, an exemption with respect to one tax may 
lead to more evasion with respect to another. We focus here on exemptions in the VAT 
that generate breaks in the information chain, given the lack of incentive to claim 
refunds or report to the tax administration. This opens up channels of evasion for the 
income taxes, as argued in Ahmad & Best (2012). 
Firms that seek to evade the corporate income tax would do so by understating their 
revenues, and/or by overstating their inputs, thus reducing their taxable profits. 
Analogously, firms seeking to evade the VAT would do so by understating their sales 
and/or overstating their purchases from other firms. From this the link becomes clear 
immediately: understating revenues in the corporate income tax can also reduce a 
firm’s VAT liability and over-reporting purchases for VAT purposes also reduces a firm’s 
CIT liability, provided the firm is not completely out of the tax net.  
The strength and magnitude of the interaction effect will depend crucially on the 
incentives that firms face. These incentives are determined by two forces. The first is 
the rate of tax that applies to a firm’s sales and purchases. The higher is the tax rate, the 
stronger is the incentive of a firm to misstate its activities in order to evade (at least a 
part of) the tax.  
The second aspect of a firm’s incentives is the ease with which a firm can misreport and 
get away with it and consequently the probability that its misstatement will be detected. 
A key advantage of a uniformly applied VAT is that incentives to report truthfully travel 
up and down production chains. One firm’s sales are a downstream firm’s purchases 
and so a firm trying to underreport its sales would cause the downstream firm to 
underreport its inputs, thus increasing the downstream firm’s tax liability. A uniformly 
applied VAT therefore creates a strong incentive for the downstream firm to demand 
that the purchase be declared truthfully.  
The first consideration implies that firms that face a higher VAT evade more and thus 
pay less in CIT as well as VAT. We call this the “temptation effect”. The second 
consideration implies that firms that find it easier to evade will evade more. In 
particular, we expect that when the production chain is “broken” by the VAT (because of 
exemptions, for example), firms will find it easier to misreport their CIT liability. This is 
because when there is an exemption, the VAT system no longer generates the incentives 
for truthful reporting. Also, as crucial information about transactions that could be used 
in an audit is lost, the threat of discovery is reduced. We will call this the (absence of) 
“information effect”.   
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A. DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
Our empirical strategy tries to quantify how incentives to cheat on the VAT can have 
spillover effects onto the taxable profits a firm declares for income tax purposes. This 
constitutes a tax interaction effect. In the Mexican setting, two key features of the VAT 
system provide an opportunity for us to quantify these effects, as they both create 
variations in the incentives to cheat on the VAT. The first is that different goods are 
treated differently by the VAT system. Some goods are exempted from their VAT 
liabilities: firms neither pay VAT on their sales nor do they have the right to claim a tax 
credit for their purchases, resulting in a very low incentive to report either sales or 
purchases truthfully to the government. Other goods are zero-rated: firms do not pay 
VAT on their sales. However, they do have the right to claim tax credits for their 
purchases, generating very little incentive to ensure that sales are truthfully reported, 
but preserving the incentive to try to over-report purchases. This generates variation 
across goods both in the rate of VAT that is paid on their sale and in the incentives firms 
have to report sales and purchases truthfully. 
The second feature of the Mexican VAT that we will exploit is the fact that a good faces a 
different VAT rate, depending on where in the country it is sold. The location specific 
rate of VAT is 5% lower (10% versus 15% until 2009, and 11% versus 16% since 2010), 
in border areas. This means that the incentives to cheat on the VAT are stronger in the 
interior of the country than in the border regions, as there is more to gain from cheating 
since the rate is higher. What is more, since a reduction in declared value added will 
also reduce declared taxable profits for income tax purposes, we expect taxable profits 
to be lower in the interior also through the tax interaction effect.  
Taken alone, neither of these features of the Mexican VAT allows us to compellingly 
identify the effects of the VAT on the income tax. There are all sorts of reasons why 
reported profits might vary across goods, ranging from differences in barriers to entry 
to different sectors to differences in the availability of foreign competitors etc., and 
some of these reasons will be correlated with the taxable status of the goods. Similarly, 
there are any number of reasons why profit rates may be different in the border regions 
than in non-border regions, from the quality of local infrastructure and institutions to 
the climate, and, of course, the proximity to export markets, and most of these will have 
nothing to do with the VAT rate.  
However, taken together, these two features can allow us to identify the tax interaction 
effects. The size of the incentives to cheat generated by the differences across goods in 
their tax status will depend on the level of the general VAT rate (10% or 15%). This 
implies that we should expect all the effects across goods to be stronger in the interior 
where the applicable rate is higher than in the border regions. To verify this, we employ 
a difference in differences strategy comparing firms across products and geographic 
regions. Combining these two sources of variation will allow us to control for any 
differences across products in declared profits that are constant across regions, and also 
for any differences between the regions that are constant across products. 
In terms of the temptation effect, firms that sell goods that are zero-rated or exempted 
should be less tempted to underreport their sales than those that sell goods taxed at the 
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general rate all else equal, since this would not cause their VAT liability to decrease 
(although underreporting sales may still cause their CIT liability to decrease). This 
implies that all else equal, reported profits should be lower for firms selling a product 
taxed at the general rate than for firms selling a zero-rated or exempted product. In 
addition, firms that sell zero-rated or general rate products have an incentive to 
overstate their purchases if possible, while exempted firms do not, since they are unable 
to claim an input tax credit for them. This implies that all else equal, reported profits 
should be lower for firms selling zero or general rated products than for firms selling 
exempted products.  
In terms of the information effect, firms that are one step down the production chain 
from the point at which it is broken by an exemption are likely to find it easy to 
misreport their input purchases. This would also apply in the case of zero-rated 
products if the probability of receiving refunds is high, and the product becomes 
effectively exempt—reducing the incentive to report to the tax administration. In both 
cases, there would be an effective break in the information chain. A firm over-reporting 
its purchases of exempted or zero-rated products will not increase the VAT liability of 
the upstream producer, so the upstream producer has no (VAT) incentive to prevent the 
over-reporting. Of course, this over-reporting of purchases, if mirrored by over-
reporting of sales by the upstream producer, would increase the upstream producer’s 
CIT liability, so here the tax interaction effects act to dampen the incentives generated 
by the differential treatment of the VAT. In such cases, it would be very easy to make 
reports for their CIT liability that are very different from what is reported for the VAT, 
given that their VAT declaration generates no tax liability. 
It should be noted that this difference in differences strategy only identifies the tax 
interaction effect if there is no other reason that declared profitability varies across 
firms that also varies across products and regions in a way that is systematically related 
to the VAT rate. Such a concern would exist if, for example, the sectors which auditors 
focused on were different in the border region than in the interior. In particular, there 
may be stronger audit capabilities along the northern frontier, and this may shift their 
sectoral focus. Another possibility is if the relative profitability of sectors is different in 
the different areas in a way that is correlated with the tax rate—given data limitations, 
we are unable to address this issue at present, and investigating it will have to be taken 
up in future work. 
We aim to test the interaction effects between different taxes a firm faces empirically 
using two different datasets from Mexico. First, we use data on income tax returns from 
Mexico’s Tax Administration (SAT). These tax returns are extensive, and in particular, 
contain the variables we will need for our exercise, the firm’s profits (sales as well as 
costs), the product it sells, and the location of the firm.  
Then we run the same analysis using data from the 2009 round of the economic census 
carried out by Mexico’s Statistical Agency: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e 
Informática (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, INEGI). Here, we present 
estimates using data aggregated to the municipality x product level, and as a result, our 
estimates are less precise than for the SAT data. However, in ongoing work, we will 
estimate the same regressions on the INEGI microdata to make the two estimates more 
comparable. 
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INEGI goes to great lengths to reassure census respondents that none of the data will be 
shared with the government, so that businesses are more likely to respond truthfully. 
To the extent that this is true, we expect that the INEGI data reveals a picture closer to 
the real activities of the businesses, while the SAT data will contain all the misreporting 
that firms do as well as any real responses to the tax treatment of their products. We 
thus expect to find more pronounced and significant results using the SAT data than 
using the INEGI data.  
The dependent variable is a measure of the firms’ declared profits which comprise the 
basis for the two main taxes on corporations, the income tax (Impuesto Sobre la Renta, 
ISR), and the flax tax on business operations, (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única, IETU). 
The taxpayer does not pay the total of both but the higher of the two.  
For the SAT data, we construct a  measure of the declared profits of each firm,  dividing 
the firm’s ISR liability by its declared sales, p. For the INEGI data, we similarly create a 
measure of the firm’s reported profits: sales minus expenses, divided by sales. 
We then construct three different dummies for the region a firm is in: borderr is a 
dummy equal to 1 if a firm is located in an administrative area r that contains 
municipalities in the border region,4 borderNr is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is located 
in the border region in the north of the country, and borderSr is a dummy equal to 1 if a 
firm is located in the border region in the south of the country. In each case the 
dummies equal 0 if the firm is located in the interior region.  
Next, we construct two different dummies for the taxable status of a firm’s output, 
depending on the taxable status of the goods it predominantly sells: outputexemptg is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm sells a product that is exempted and outputzerog is a 
dummy equal to 1 if firm i sells a good g that is zero-rated. In both cases, the dummies 
equal 0 if the good falls under the general rate. 
Finally, we use the 2008 input-output table for Mexico to calculate two measures of the 
taxable status of a firm’s inputs: the share of the firm’s inputs that are exempted from 
the VAT, inputexemptg, and the share of the firm’s inputs that are taxed at the zero rate, 
inputzerog. The input-output table currently available is at the level of the 3-digit 
economic sector. There are 79 of these, while the tax status of a good is defined at the 5-
digit level. To get around this, we take data from the economic census of 2008 (which 
the input-output table is based on) to generate the share of each 3-digit sector that 
goods of the two tax statuses represent.  
We then run regressions to test our first hypothesis, that firms which face a higher rate 
of tax on their sales have stronger incentives to evade. In particular, we estimate 
equation (1), where outputg is either outputexemptg or outputzerog, and borderr is either 
borderr, borderNr or borderSr. 
 
                                                             
4 Unlike the INEGI data, the SAT data does not contain the municipality that the firm is located 
in, but a larger geographic area defined by SAT for taxation purposes. This could cause some 
imprecision in the estimates as some of the firms that are tagged as being in the border zone are 
not really in the border zone. The likely direction of this bias is towards zero as we are 
overstating the number of border firms, and so our “treatment group” of border firms contains 
some untreated firms. 
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  (1) 
 
We are interested in the coefficient  on the interaction between the good dummy and 
the region dummy as our hypothesis predicts that it will be negative. That is, that the 
difference between firms whose outputs are taxed and firms whose outputs are not is 
smaller in the border regions where the difference in the tax rate, and hence the 
incentive to cheat, is smaller.  
To test our second hypothesis, that firms just below a break in the production chain find 
it easier to cheat, we run regressions of the form: 
 
  (2) 
  
where now instead of the taxable status of the sales, we are using the share of a sector’s 
inputs that are untaxed. Again, we are interested in the coefficient  on the interaction 
term. This time, however, our hypothesis is that it will be positive. That is, firms who 
find it easier to cheat because more of their inputs are untaxed will cheat less in the 
border regions where the incentives to cheat are lower because the tax rate is lower.  
In order to control more flexibly for the product that the firm makes, rather than using a 
dummy for the taxable status of the good as a control, we use good fixed effects  (at 
the 5-digit sector level). Thus the analogue of equation (1) is : 
 
                     (               )       (3)  
 
and similarly for equation (2): 
 
                     (              )       (4)  
 
 Finally, we combine the temptation effect (our first hypothesis) and the information 
effect (our second hypothesis) into a single regression to check that one isn’t simply 
picking up the effect of the other and so we run regressions of the form: 
 
                    (               )    (              )       (5)  
 
We run these regressions for all the permutations between each of the two different 
measures of the tax status of the goods, and the three different measures of the region 
of the firm to see where the effects are strongest.  Finally, as a further robustness check 
for the SAT data, we also exclude firms that have zero or negative tax liabilities for both 
ISR and IETU (i.e., zero or negative profits), as these presumably are not responding to 




The results using the SAT data and the INEGI data are first discussed in separate 
sections below, and then comparisons are drawn between the two. Tables 3.1 to 3.5 
below present the results using the SAT data and Tables 3.6 to 3.8 show the results 
using the INEGI data, estimating equations (3) and (4) above. 
SAT DATA 
Table 3.1 shows the results of estimating equations (3) and (4) using SAT data with 
ISR/Sales as the measure of taxable profits. Columns (1) and (4) show results for just 
the temptation effect, columns (2) and (5) show the information effect and columns (3), 
and (6) show the results when both are included in the equation at the same time.  
Columns (1)-(3) and columns (4)-(6) correspond to exempted goods and zero-rated 
goods, respectively.  
Starting with the Temptation Effect, we can see that the coefficients  on 
outputg*borderr are negative as expected. The coefficient in column (1) for exempted 
goods, for instance, suggest that the difference in declared profits of firms whose 
products are exempted from the VAT and firms whose products are subject to the 
general rate is 0. 2% of sales smaller in the border region than in the interior. 
Comparing this with column (4) for zero-rated goods, this effect seems to be much 
stronger for zero-rated goods. This may be due to the fact that the input refunds to the 
zero-rated sector provide an asymmetric incentive to cheat, whereas the general rate 
firms face the same tax rate on their inputs as on their outputs. The case of the exempt 
firms is interesting—they would face higher taxes on their inputs in the interior, but no 
taxes on the outputs, so bear a higher effective tax in the interior than the border region. 
Turning to the Information Effect, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
significant for exempted goods in column (2). This estimate of 0.043 suggests that a firm 
going from having only taxed inputs to having only untaxed inputs pays 4.3% more of 
sales in ISR if it is in the border region rather than in the interior. Here looking across 
columns suggests that in contrast to the temptation effect, the information effect is only 
present for exempted goods and not for zero-rated goods as shown in column (5). This 
is consistent with the idea that zero-rated products are still in the tax net, whereas 
exempted products may have an incentive to slip outside the tax net. 
Table 3.2 shows the results of repeating the ISR/Sales regressions using the northern 
border region and Table 3.3 shows the results from the southern border region. The 
results show clearly that all the effect comes from the northern border region on the 
United States border not the southern border region. This may be due to the 
concentration of economic activity and trade in the North.  The results using only firms 
that pay some tax are also qualitatively similar and so are presented in the annex. 
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TABLE 3.1  EFFECTS OF EXCLUSION OF SALES FROM VAT ON ISR 
 
IRS/Sales 
  Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border .009*** .005*** .005*** .009*** .008*** .008*** 
 (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) 
       
Output*Border -.002  -.002 -.007***  -.009*** 
 (.002)  (.002) (.001)  (.002) 
       
Input*Border   .043*** .050***  -.003 .009 
  (.009) (.009)  (.004) (.005) 
       
Constant .012 .246*** .013* .035*** .246*** .035*** 
 (.007) (.060) (.007) (.001) (.060) (.001) 
Observations 106846 118795 106846 112837 118795 112837 
R-squared .122 .121 .123 .111 .120 .111 
F-stat on Sectors 29.6 26.9 29.2 26.1 27.2 26.1 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  







TABLE 3.2  EFFECTS OF EXCLUSION OF SALES FROM VAT IN THE NORTHERN BORDER REGION 
  
ISR/Sales 
   Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border .008*** .003*** .004*** .008*** .008*** .008*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Output*Border -.003  -.003 -.010***  -.011*** 
 (.002)  (.002) (.002)  (.002) 
       
Input*Border  .055*** .064***  -.009 .008 
  (.010) (.010)  (.005) (.006) 
       
Constant .013* .246*** .013* .036*** .246*** .036*** 
 (.007) (.060) (.007) (.001) (.060) (.001) 
Observations 106846 118795 106846 112837 118795 112837 
R-squared .122 .120 .122 .110 .120 .110 
F-stat on Sectors 29.7 27.0 29.3 26.2 27.3 26.2 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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TABLE 3.3  EFFECTS OF EXCLUSION OF SALES FROM VAT IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER REGION 
  
ISR/Sales 
 Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border .007*** .009*** .009*** .007*** .006*** .007*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Output*Border .002  .002 .005  .004 
 (.004)  (.004) (.003)  (.003) 
       
Input*Border  -.021 -.023  .015 .009 
  (.019) (.020)  (.009) (.011) 
       
Constant .013* .246*** .013* .037*** .246*** .037*** 
 (.007) (.060) (.007) (.001) (.060) (.001) 
Observations 106846 118795 106846 112837 118795 112837 
R-squared .120 .118 .120 .108 .118 .108 
F-stat on Sectors 29.9 27.4 29.8 26.2 27.4 26.2 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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The results show large tax interaction effects between the VAT and the CIT system. In 
fact, if anything, these are lower bounds on the true effects. The data we are using is 
from firms who completed and submitted all the required tax declarations (Income tax, 
VAT, Payroll) and as such should be considered a selected sample of the most compliant 
firms.  
The annex contains tables that show the results excluding firms that pay no tax from the 
data. The results do not greatly deviate from those discussed in the text.  
We would expect the temptation and information effect to be even stronger amongst 
less compliant firms and so the overall effect is likely to be even larger. 
 
INEGI DATA 
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 show the results using the INEGI data. Again, columns (1) and (4) show 
results for just the temptation effect, columns (2) and (5) show the information effect 
and columns (3) and (6) show the results for both at the same time, i.e. where one 
controls for the other, thereby assuring that one is not simply picking up the effects of 
the other. Once again, columns (1)-(3) and columns (4)-(6) are split into exempted 
goods and zero-rated goods, respectively. 
Table 3.4 compares firms on the border to firms in the interior. Looking at the 
Temptation Effect, we can see that the coefficient on Output*Border is negative as 
expected, but unlike in the SAT data, it is not significant. However, it is of a similar 
magnitude to the coefficient estimated from the SAT data. The coefficient in column (3) 
suggests that the difference between profits of firms whose sales are exempted from the 
VAT and firms that are subject to the general rate is 0.7% of sales smaller in the border 
region than in the interior. Looking across at column (6) for zero-rated goods, the 
coefficient is slightly smaller.  
Turning to the Information Effect, the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive 
but not significant for exempted goods (columns (2) and (3)), but negative though 
insignificant for zero-rated goods (columns (5) and (6)). Column (3) suggests that a firm 
going from having only taxed inputs to having only exempted inputs, while controlling 
for the temptation effect, makes 5.4% more profit in the border region than in the 
interior. In contrast, column (6) suggests that a firm going from having only taxed 
inputs to having only zero-rated inputs, controlling for the temptation effect, makes 
0.6% less profit in the border than in the interior. This suggests that in contrast to the 
temptation effect, the information effect is again more likely to be present for exempted 
goods and not for zero-rated goods. However, neither is significant.  
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the results for firms on the northern border and southern 
border respectively. The results are qualitatively the same apart from some small 
differences. On the northern border, the information effect is negative for both 
exempted and zero-rated inputs, though again neither is significant. On the southern 
border, however, the interaction effect for exempted inputs is positive, very large and 
significant, possibly suggesting that there is an observable information effect here, 








 Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border -.014*** -.018*** -.017*** -.014*** -.015*** -.014*** 
 (.002) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
       
Output*Border -.008  -.007 -.004  -.003 
 (.007)  (.007) (.006)  (.006) 
       
Input*Border  .049 .054  -.010 -.006 
  (.043) (.049)  (.016) (.017) 
       
Observations 126503 155491 126503 141551 155491 141551 
R-squared .888 .907 .888 .914 .907 .914 
F-stat on Sectors 1927.3 2618.8 1918.0 2899.6 2631.7 2894.6 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001" 
  




TABLE 3.5: EFFECTS OF EXCLUSION OF SALES FROM VAT IN THE NORTHERN BORDER REGION 
  
Profits/Sales 
 Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border -.019*** -.018*** -.017*** -.019*** -.020*** -.019*** 
 (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
       
Output*Border -.007  -.007 -.009  -.009 
 (.008)  (.008) (.007)  (.008) 
       
Input*Border  -.045 -.036  -.014 -.002 
  (.050) (.056)  (.020) (.022) 
       
Observations 124402 152954 124402 139267 152954 139267 
R-squared .888 .907 .888 .914 .907 .914 
F-stat on Sectors 1917.5 2611.1 1911.5 2885.3.6 2619.3 2882.2 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  












 Exempt Zero-Rated 
 Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border -.003 -.019** -.020** -.003 -.003 -.002 
 (.004) (.006) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
       
Output*Border -.011  -.007 .004  .006 
 (.013)  (.013) (.009)  (.010) 
       
Input*Border  .264*** .278**  -.007 -.015 
  (.079) (.092)  (.027) (.029) 
       
Observations 121177 149374 121177 136038 149374 136038 
R-squared .888 .908 .889 .914 .908 .914 
F-stat on Sectors 1908.5 2606.5 1905.4 2878.9 2610.8 2876.9 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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SAT VS. INEGI DATA 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 below summarize the results when both the temptation and the 
information effects are both included in the same equation, placing the SAT data and the 
INEGI data along-side one another for easier comparison. While Table 3.7 shows outputs 
and inputs that are exempted from the VAT (as opposed to falling under the general rate), 
Table 3.8 shows outputs and inputs that are zero-rated. 
Comparing the SAT data with the INEGI data shows that the information effects only tend 
to be significant using the former. This could be indicative of firms misreporting to the tax 
administration but not to INEGI, meaning that the information effect has only minor 
consequences for real economic activity, but large consequences for government revenues 
through evasion.  
Some caveats should be noted in relation to the comparability of the datasets. First, while 
the SAT data is at the firm level, the INEGI data is aggregated data within a municipality-
product group and thus less exact. Second, it is expected that tax compliant firms will be 
over-represented in the SAT data. These may be more likely to be general-rated VAT firms. 
In further research, one would want to use a decomposition approach á la Fortim, Lemieux 
and Firpo (2011) to decompose the comparison between the two datasets into the part that 
comes from differences in the sample of firms represented in the two datasets and the part 
coming from differences in reporting to SAT and INEGI.   
The results for the temptation effect (using SAT data) suggest that going from the 10% VAT 
rate at the border to the 15% rate in the interior (in isolation) implies that firms in the 
interior face a reduced profitability of around 0.7% of sales. Similarly, the estimates of the 
information effect suggest that declared profitability is affected by 4.3 percentage points. 
While the INEGI data tends to go in the same direction, the effects tend not to be significant. 
This can be regarded as evidence of considerable misreporting of profits to the tax 
administration for CIT purposes compared to “real” profits announced on a confidential 
basis to the Economic Census.  
 
Unlike with exemptions that open up incentives to cheat with the ISR and reduce the flow 
of information, the zero-rating regime does not generate the same incentives. Thus the 
differences in reporting to the SAT and INEGI are negligible. This does not preclude the 
possibility of fraudulent claims for domestic zero-rating, especially in the case of weaker 
tax administrations in some regions in Mexico (as would also be the case in countries with 
weaker tax administrations, such as Pakistan).  However, the temptation effect vis a vis the 
zero-rating regime is likely to be quite high. 
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TABLE 3.7: COMPARISON OF SAT VS. INEGI DATA (EXEMPTED GOODS) 
 
Profits/Sales 
 border borderN borderS 
 INEGI SAT INEGI SAT INEGI SAT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border -.017*** .005*** -.017*** .004*** -.020** .009*** 
 (.004) (.001) (.004) (.001) (.007) (.002) 
       
OutputExempt*border -.007 -.002 -.007 -.003 -.007 .002 
 (.007) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.013) (.004) 
       
InputExempt*border .054 .050*** -.036 .064*** .278** -.023 
 (.049) (.009) (.056) (.010) (.092) (.020) 
       
Constant   .013*   .013*   .013* 
   (.007)   (.007)   (.007) 
Observations 126503 106846 126503 106846 121177 106846 
R-squared .888 .123 .888 .122 .888 .120 
F-stat on Sectors 1918.1 29.2 1911.5 29.3 1905.4 29.8 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses   







TABLE 3.8: COMPARISON OF SAT VS. INEGI DATA (ZERO-RATED GOODS) 
 
Profits/Sales 
 border borderN borderS 
 INEGI SAT INEGI SAT INEGI SAT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border -.014*** .008*** -.019*** .008*** -.002 .007*** 
 (.002) (.001) (.003) (.001) (.004) (.001) 
       
OutputZero*border -.003 -.009*** -.009 -.011*** .006 .004 
 (.006) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.010) (.003) 
       
InputZero*border -.006 .009 -.002 .008 -.015 .009 
 (.017) (.005) (.022) (.006) (.029) (.011) 
       
Constant   .035***   .036***   .037*** 
   (.001)   (.001)   (.001) 
Observations 141551 112837 139267 112837 136038 112837 
R-squared .914 .111 .914 .110 .914 .108 
F-stat on Sectors 2894.6 26.1 2882.2 26.2 2876.9 26.2 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  





4. TOWARDS A TAX REFORM AGENDA FOR MEXICO AND OTHER 
COUNTRIES WITH INFORMALITY AND INCENTIVES TO CHEAT 
A. MENU OF OPTIONS FOR MEXICO 
Mexican tax rates are by and large in line with international practice, and especially in 
relation with prevailing levels in Latin American countries. The poor revenue performance 
is instead predominantly due to the “holes” in the tax system that also provide ample 
opportunities to cheat and evade taxation.  The most pernicious holes are ostensibly due to 
“good intentions”—providing relief to the poor, encouraging investment, or just simplifying 
tax administration and genuflexion to the altar of sub-national revenue assignment (with 
REPECOS). Very few of these special provisions meet their objectives, as the analysis 
shows, and instead create opportunities to evade and cheat. 
While Antón, Hernández and Levy (2012) focus on the formal social security system and 
the formal payroll taxes as sources of informality, in this paper we focus on the tax breaks, 
exemptions and splits in tax bases as the cause of much of the incentive to evade. Both sets 
of analysis focus on introducing a clean VAT to maximise the information effect and choke 
off opportunities to cheat.  
The analysis of the interactions shows that the break in the information chain makes it 
easier to misrepresent profits for the purposes of the CIT. The results from the SAT data 
show that, while there are probably some fraudulent refunds with the domestic VAT zero-
rating system, by far the largest incentives to cheat come from the VAT exemptions that 
break the information chain, together with possibilities of arbitrage from the multiple rates 
for the same class of goods.  
The patterns from the SAT data are repeated in the INEGI data, although the coefficients 
are different. A juxtaposition of the results using SAT and INEGI data suggest that there 
may be strong incentives to “misrepresent” profits to SAT, whereas the innocuous INEGI 
information may actually be closer to the truth.  
The first conclusion that we draw from the analysis is that any reforms to either VAT or CIT 
must be coordinated. Partial reforms that do not address the information effects on other 
taxes may end up losing revenues. As the temptation effect continues to apply, it will do so 
with greater force since the interactions between taxes lead to reduced reported profits. It 
would be insufficient to try to offset the temptation effects by, say, eliminating the VAT 
border rates, without also addressing the exemptions in the VAT chain that are leading to 
the incomplete information effect. 
A clear recommendation is to eliminate the special provisions and exemptions in the VAT 
in order to maximise the information effect.  Something of a “temptation effect” may still 
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remain, as the interactions with the corporate income tax will squeeze profits as the 
avenues for “cheating” are choked off.  Note that the information effect relates to inputs and 
outputs that form part of the production chain. Thus, goods like unprocessed foods, which 
are part of final consumption, and also of importance in the consumption baskets of the 
poor could be left exempt without affecting the information effect. This would also 
minimize the need for compensatory measures for the poorest households. 
Although it is hard to make a case for reduction in corporate tax rates to minimize the 
burden on firms that have been cheating and evading taxes, there may well be an argument 
to examine whether the level of the CIT in relation to the rates in the main trading partners 
is appropriate, especially China, and other Latin American countries. For trade with China, 
Mexico may consider a convergence of the CIT towards the new international “normal” of 
around 25%, largely driven by the reformed corporate tax rates in China and other trading 
partners. This may be important especially if the reforms envisaged also involve the 
elimination of the maquiladora regime. 
However, it still remains to be determined what the overall tax system should look like, 
taking into account the effects on the poor—for this we refer to Ahmad and Stern (1991) 
for an overall framework, focussing on the effects on households in various circumstances 
as well as firms, given a particular revenue target. Further, the effects of tax reforms on the 
states and subnational governments could be dealt with as was the case for the IETU, with 
a hold harmless condition, and using the existing sharing arrangements. Consideration 
could also be given to introducing an “equalization transfer system” for the general-
purpose transfers (see Ahmad, González-Anaya, Revilla, and others, 2007), to offset the 
disequalizing effect of revenue-sharing.   
B. FURTHER DEVELOPING THE POLICY AGENDA IN MEXICO 
The main lines of reform to consolidate Mexican public finances are through plugging the 
holes in the “Swiss cheese” tax system, and blocking incentives to cheat and evade taxes. 
This is to be determined largely through fixing the VAT, and the concomitant reforms that 
will be needed to constitute a “sustainable” package—recalling that stand alone attempts to 
do this by both the Fox and Calderón administrations failed. 
The first issue is to examine more fully the impact on other taxes and provisions—these 
primarily involve the maquiladoras and REPECOS. As mentioned, the former issue could be 
handled through an adjustment of corporate tax rates, and the effects on production 
decisions should be minimal. With respect to REPECOS, the options have to be explored in 
greater details. 
One option is to assign the revenues from small taxpayers to municipal governments, like a 
fee for service, but linked to the lowering of the VAT threshold (e.g., by 50 percent).  With 
the improvement in overall revenue generation (e.g., if the C-efficiency goes up to 45%, or 
around Sri Lankan standards), an additional 3% of GDP, with a 50% share for states would 
give them an additional 1.5% of GDP—as opposed to virtually no revenues generated by 
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REPECOS. Municipalities would benefit, and with the greater knowledge of local taxpayers, 
would make the new business tax work effectively. Together with a recalibration of the 
property tax (although the cadaster/valuation could be contracted to higher levels)—the 
lowest level of government would be put in a much better position to better provide local 
services and be held accountable for results. 
The main difficulty remains at the state level—even if more shared revenues are generated 
over time as a result of the reforms. There is a need for own-source revenues at the 
intermediate level of government, in order to engender greater responsibility. This could 
be achieved, for example, through a piggy-back on the ISR, with which states could set the 
marginal tax rate (with a band). An equalization framework would be needed in order to 
avoid concentration of resources in the well-to-do states.  
It would be necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of gainers and losers, and the 
identification of appropriate compensation mechanisms. This could include categorical 
transfers that do not affect labour mobility—e.g., for children and nursing women. This 
may be more useful than relying on conditional cash transfers on the basis of household 
fixed assets (Oportunidades) which still has a benefit as a general poverty reduction 
scheme, but is less useful to compensate tax losses as the affected people are not likely to 
be the same. 
The new framework could be introduced using a hold harmless condition for the states, 
and phased in over time (as was the case with the 1994 Chinese reforms, as well as the 
IETU introduction in Mexico in 2007)—see Ahmad et al, 2007; and Ahmad 2010. This 
would address the political economy considerations that would be needed to get any set of 
policy options through Congress. 
Further work is also needed on the underlying incentive structures—using both INEGI 
firm-level information to supplement the analysis carried out in this paper; and also SAT 
data using VAT returns. 
Lastly, it should be explored whether carbon tax revenues could be used for “green 
investments” and more efficient industrial restructuring and if carbon tax and 
restructuring of the petroleum sector could enhance the scope for contracts/production 
sharing arrangements with the private sector, while keeping PEMEX ownership and 
control, as specified under the constitution.  
C. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES WITH INFORMALITY AND CHEATING 
A key lesson from Mexico is that, even if a country has a first class tax administration with 
good information systems, there is little that can be done to raise revenues on the 
administrative tightening aspects if the tax policy framework is full of holes, and taxpayers 
have the incentive and ability to evade, or legally engage in tax avoidance. As in some 
countries in Asia, such as Pakistan, the use of third party information to identify the groups 
who are cheating is a useful device for blocking cheating. However, if this is not 
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accompanied by tax policy reforms to establish a level playing field, it is unlikely to be 
sufficient to raise substantial sums of revenues. Indeed, partial reforms as seen in the 
context of Mexico, that do not begin to address the information effects, could increase the 
temptation effects and lose revenues. 
In the final analysis, third party information could be useful as a cross-check and an 
attractive handle to address the issue of effective audit within a strengthening of a regular 
functional tax administration. But without policy reforms, or if combined with an amnesty, 
additional revenues are far from guaranteed (Ahmad and Malik, forthcoming). 
The situation would be even worse in cases where the authorities in desperation begin to 
use amnesties (see Baer and Le Bourgne 2008), often without the benefit of tightening the 
policy framework. This just increases the temptation effects without addressing the 
information circuits. Also, the prospect of future amnesties creates a further distortion 
against honest taxpayers, should there be any, and ensures that there would be an 
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ANNEX: REGRESSIONS USING SAT DATA 
EXCLUDING FIRMS WHO PAY NO TAX 
ISR/SALES 
TABLE A1: ISR REGRESSIONS POOLING BOTH BORDER REGIONS 
 
  Exempt Zero-Rated 
  Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Border .008*** .004*** .004*** .008*** .008*** .008*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
              
Outputs Out*Border -.002   -.002 -.007***   -.008*** 
  (.002)   (.002) (.002)   (.002) 
              
Inputs Out*Border   .054*** .062***   -.005 .007 
    (.011) (.011)   (.005) (.006) 
              
Constant .020* .246*** .021* .047*** .246*** .047*** 
  (.009) (.065) (.009) (.001) (.065) (.001) 
              
Observations 81131 90562 81131 85987 90562 85987 
R-squared .133 .131 .133 .120 .131 .120 
F-stat on Sectors 25.6 23.6 25.3 22.6 23.8 22.6 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001           





TABLE A2: ISR REGRESSIONS IN THE NORTHERN BORDER REGION 
 
  Exempt Zero-Rated 
  Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BorderN .008*** .002 .002* .008*** .007*** .007*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
              
Outputs Out*BorderN -.003   -.003 .010***   .011*** 
  (.003)   (.003) (.002)   (.002) 
              
Inputs Out*BorderN   .069*** .078***   -.011 .005 
    (.011) (.012)   (.006) (.007) 
              
Constant .020* .246*** .021* .047*** .246*** .047*** 
  (.009) (.065) (.009) (.001) (.065) (.001) 
              
Observations 81131 90562 81131 85987 90562 85987 
R-squared .132 .131 .133 .120 .130 .120 
F-stat on Sectors 25.7 23.6 25.4 22.8 23.8 22.8 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses           




TABLE A3: ISR REGRESSIONS IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER REGION 
 
  Exempt Zero-Rated 
  Outputs Inputs Both Outputs Inputs Both 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BorderS .007*** .009*** .009*** .007*** .006*** .007*** 
  (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
              
Outputs Out*BorderS .002   .002 .006   .004 
  (.005)   (.005) (.004)   (.004) 
              
Inputs Out*BorderS   -.022 -.022   .018 .010 
    (.023) (.024)   (.011) (.013) 
              
Constant .021* .246*** .021* .049*** .246*** .049*** 
  (.009) (.065) (.009) (.001) (.065) (.001) 
              
Observations 81131 90562 81131 85987 90562 85987 
R-squared .131 .130 .131 .119 .130 .119 
F-stat on Sectors 25.8 23.8 25.8 22.7 23.8 22.7 
(P-value) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001           
 
 
